October 5, 2001
The Foreign Terrorist List
The first appendix presents the [United States Department of State](entity:organization-recall-organization-united-states-de-22250f77a88b)’s report on foreign terrorist organizations. It recounts the designation system’s history: [Madeleine Albright](entity:character-recall-character-99b534cd1856) approved the first list of thirty groups in 1997, renewed twenty-seven designations in 1999 while allowing three to lapse, and added [Al-Qaeda](entity:organization-recall-organization-al-qaeda-ebcf625e71b9) that year and the [Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan](entity:organization-recall-organization-islamic-movement-9cd8ca752c29) in 2000.
In October 2001, [Colin Powell](entity:character-recall-character-8291bd595638) renewed twenty-six of the twenty-eight designations and combined [Kahane Chai](entity:organization-recall-organization-kahane-chai-5fbe49656334) and [Kach](entity:organization-recall-organization-kach-b0ff74f45a21) under a single designation. The appendix then lists the twenty-eight groups and sets out three legal criteria: an organization must be foreign, engage in activity defined as terrorism by law, and pose a threat to American citizens’ safety or to [United States](entity:location-recall-location-5d55e9152db1) national security.
in the October 5, 2001 report
The Legal Definition of Terrorism
The appendix defines terrorist activity through a catalogue of unlawful acts, including hijacking, sabotage, hostage-taking, attacks on internationally protected persons, assassination, and the use or threatened use of biological, chemical, nuclear, explosive, or firearm weapons in ways that endanger people or cause substantial property damage.
It also counts threats, attempts, and conspiracies as relevant acts, and defines participation broadly enough to include planning, gathering target information, providing material assistance, raising funds, and recruiting or inciting others. The report closes by connecting these activities to the statutory concept of material support, which can apply to assistance rendered by individuals as well as organizational members.
in the October 5, 2001 report
The Designation Procedure
The report describes a process in which the secretary of state decides whether to designate or renew a designation after reviewing a detailed intelligence-based record of a group’s activities. The State Department prepares an administrative record with the Justice Department, the Treasury Department, and intelligence agencies, then confidentially notifies Congress seven days before a designation appears in the Federal Register.
Designations are subject to judicial review, though the government relies on the confidential administrative record when challenged in federal court. A designation expires after two years unless renewed; new groups can be added at any time, and a designation may be revoked after Congress is notified.
in the October 5, 2001 report
Consequences of Designation
The report explains that designation has concrete legal consequences: people under [United States](entity:location-recall-location-5d55e9152db1) jurisdiction may not provide a listed organization with material support, certain foreign representatives or members may be denied visas or deported, and American financial institutions must block the organization’s funds and report them to the relevant Treasury office.
Beyond these penalties, the designation is intended to discourage contributions, raise public awareness, notify other governments of American concerns, and isolate the named organizations internationally. The appendix thereby documents how the government turns its classification of terrorism into restrictions on money, movement, and public association.
in the months after the September 11 attacks
Predictions Confirmed
Turning to the long-term consequences of the attacks, the author argues that they accelerated trends already under way, including the [Bush administration](entity:organization-recall-organization-bush-administrat-b2a3b6fe03df)'s effort to expand its military freedom of action. Governments around the world invoked the attacks to introduce or intensify repressive policies.
[Russia](entity:location-recall-location-e36341713c23) and [China](entity:location-recall-location-134e6ca3a450) joined the counterterrorism coalition while seeking greater latitude for their own repression. [Turkey](entity:location-recall-location-c27b19c1bfda) offered troops for the new phase of the campaign, and its prime minister described the offer as repayment for American support during Turkey’s violent campaign against Kurds. The author notes the irony of Turkey being treated as a guardian against terrorism after receiving American arms and diplomatic backing for its own abuses; [Israel](entity:location-recall-location-e1a1566e26c9), too, anticipated stronger American support for harsher measures against Palestinians.
in the months after the September 11 attacks
Domestic Repression and Patriotism
The author argues that even democratic societies, including the [United States](entity:location-recall-location-5d55e9152db1), used fear and demands for patriotism to discipline their populations and pass unpopular laws under the banner of counterterrorism. In practice, patriotic appeals meant that the public should keep quiet while those in power pursued their own agenda.
The [Bush administration](entity:organization-recall-organization-bush-administrat-b2a3b6fe03df), he contends, seized the moment to advance policies that harmed most Americans, including future generations, while serving the narrow interests of powerful corporations. He presents these developments as confirmation that his initial predictions about the political use of the attacks had largely come true.
after the 2001 War in Afghanistan
New Bases in Central Asia
The author identifies the establishment of substantial American military bases in [Central Asia](entity:location-recall-location-801b1b88b04b) as one of the major consequences of the attacks. He links their strategic value to the region’s resources and to the effort to strengthen American influence over multinational investment and the contemporary “Great Game.”
The bases also extend a wider system of military positions intended to secure the [Persian Gulf](entity:location-recall-location-3dcf05f719db)’s energy resources. Before the war in [Afghanistan](entity:location-recall-location-c229ac3daed4), [Diego Garcia](entity:location-recall-location-613aa88fc124) had been the most secure base in this network; the new footholds, the author argues, make forceful intervention easier if American leaders deem it necessary.
after the 2001 War in Afghanistan
The Logic of Credibility
The author acknowledges that he has no access to classified records, but argues that the bombings of [Afghanistan](entity:location-recall-location-c229ac3daed4) may reasonably be understood as a warning to any state or actor that might defy American rules. He draws a parallel with the NATO bombings of [Serbia](entity:location-recall-location-b1e98ddb0dab), which [Tony Blair](entity:character-recall-character-6a74156a9ee5) and [Bill Clinton](entity:character-recall-character-d4288f834da1) had publicly justified as necessary to preserve the alliance’s credibility.
That credibility, he emphasizes, was not framed as Norway’s or Italy’s, but as that of the [United States](entity:location-recall-location-5d55e9152db1) and its leading arms client. For the author, the episode exemplifies a recurring logic in diplomacy: military force can be used not only against a stated target, but also to demonstrate what a dominant power is prepared to do.
April, after the 2001 War in Afghanistan
The Demonstration of American Power
The [Bush administration](entity:organization-recall-organization-bush-administrat-b2a3b6fe03df) treated the new phase of the counterterrorism campaign as an opportunity to consolidate American military supremacy and advance global dominance. During a visit to the [United States](entity:location-recall-location-5d55e9152db1), Prince Abdullah of [Saudi Arabia](entity:location-recall-location-33ea38db58f4) urged the administration to take seriously Arab anger at its support for Israeli repression.
According to the account the author cites, American officials answered that Arab opinion would not determine policy. One senior official invoked the [Afghanistan](entity:location-recall-location-c229ac3daed4) campaign as proof that the United States was far more forceful than it had been during the Gulf War; a former military official added that such firmness would earn respect and prevent further challenges. The author sees these remarks as a familiar exercise of power made newly potent by the post-attack atmosphere.
near the book’s ending
The Good-versus-Evil Rebuttal
The author observes that the simplest answer to arguments about political violence is to insist that “we” are good and “they” are bad. Because this assumption is usually left unstated and unexamined, it can shut down debate before historical evidence is considered.
When dissenting observers bring such evidence forward, the defensive reactions reveal how firmly the assumption is embedded in dominant cultural norms. The author treats those reactions as a reason to scrutinize the beliefs that shape public understanding and expectations for the future.
at the end of the main text
An Uneasy Conclusion
The author concludes that the fundamental international problems have mostly remained in place, even as the [September 11 attacks](entity:event-recall-event-september-11-attacks-8e527031f862) brought changes that could have serious and unwelcome consequences. His closing assessment returns to the book’s larger concern: the attacks did not erase older patterns of power, but gave them new opportunities and a new public rationale.
The main text then ends, followed by an appendix reproducing the [United States Department of State](entity:organization-recall-organization-united-states-de-22250f77a88b)’s October 5, 2001 report on foreign terrorist organizations. The volume’s remaining material presents that report’s designation rules and legal definitions, followed by recommended books, a brief author biography, and endnotes.
in the book’s closing pages
Recommended Reading and Biography
The second appendix offers a reading list on terrorism, state power, propaganda, and political violence. It includes several works by [Noam Chomsky](entity:character-recall-character-noam-chomsky-af5e7189d517), books co-written with Edward S. Herman, and studies by [John Cooley](entity:character-recall-character-ae63ebdf5126), Alex George, Michael McClintock, and others.
The closing biography describes Noam Chomsky’s work as a linguist, writer, and political activist, noting that he had taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1955. Endnotes then clarify references in the main text, including its allusion to the [Nicaragua](entity:location-recall-location-fdd3ef235620) case and its quoted statutory definition of terrorism.
